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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the twentieth century, a shift in tort law allowed
consumers to hold manufacturers of goods, rather than just sellers,
liable for injuries caused by said goods. 1 However, a notable
exception to this rule still exists for pharmaceuticals through the
“learned intermediary” doctrine. The learned intermediary doctrine
provides that a drug manufacturer may evade liability for injuries
caused to a patient when the manufacturer warns the prescribing
physician of the dangers associated with the drug. 2 For many years,
drug manufacturers have relied on this doctrine as a shield from
liability. But should manufacturers continue to be allowed to do so?
Since the 1990s, an epidemic has been brewing in the United
States: the opioid crisis. In 2017 alone, opioid overdoses — either
caused by prescription opioids or illicit opioids such as heroin —
caused 47,600 deaths in the United States, 3 and the opioid crisis has
cost the United States over $1 trillion from 2001 to 2017, according to

1. See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
2. See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467–68 (5th Cir. 1999).
3. Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html
[https://perma.cc/LJF2-RECF].
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estimates. 4 In light of these alarming figures, President Trump
declared the opioid crisis a “national emergency.” 5
As with any crisis, a question of liability arises and becomes
especially relevant to any legal action taken by aggrieved parties.6
Yet, when the spotlight has been pointed at pharmaceutical
manufacturers — already under fire in a number of lawsuits 7 — these
companies have attempted to shield themselves from liability using
the aforementioned learned intermediary doctrine. 8 This Note argues
that opioid drug manufacturers should not be able to hide behind the
learned intermediary doctrine.
This Note does not intend to place the burden of the opioid crisis
solely on the shoulders of drug manufacturers. “Pill mill” doctors and
heroin dealers also contributed to the opioid crisis, and doctors,
government regulators, law enforcement, and insurance companies, in
addition to drug manufacturers, all have a role to play in curbing the
epidemic.
Rather, this Note proposes that deterring drug
manufacturers by removing a barrier to liability will create the ripple
effects necessary to help alleviate the crisis.
Part I of this Note chronicles the scale and tragedy of the opioid
crisis in the United States, and how opioid manufacturers were a
direct cause of the problem. Part I then explains the learned
intermediary doctrine, which drug manufacturers are currently able to
rely on to avoid liability for harm caused by opioids. Part II proposes
4. Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALTARUM
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://altarum.org/about/news-and-events/economic-toll-of-opioidcrisis-in-u-s-exceeded-1-trillion-since-2001 [https://perma.cc/7GXB-7WY4].
5. Ali Vitali & Corky Siemaszko, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis National
NBC
NEWS
(Aug.
10,
2017,
5:38
PM),
Emergency,
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/trump-declares-opioidcrisis-national-emergency-n791576 [https://perma.cc/EM7R-ZSCT].
6. Compare Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family that Built an Empire of Pain,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/thefamily-that-built-an-empire-of-pain [https://perma.cc/6BC3-NQ7E] (blaming the
marketing tactics created by Arthur Sackler), with Dan Merica, Trump Declares
Opioid Epidemic a National Public Health Emergency, CNN (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:59
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/donald-trump-opioidPM),
epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/QHG3-K6JM] (reporting on a speech by
President Trump in which Trump put at least part of the blame on Mexican heroin
dealers).
7. Jerry Mitchell, Opioid Makers Face Hundreds of Lawsuits for Misleading
Doctors About Drug’s Addictive Nature, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018, 8:33 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/29/judge-stop-legal-fightsand-curb-opioid-epidemic/1072798001/ [https://perma.cc/79W3-Y894].
8. See, e.g., Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 708 (E.D. Ky.
2003) (holding plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims against Purdue over OxyContin
labeling were barred by the learned intermediary doctrine).
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that an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine should be
carved out for prescription opioids. This exception is based on the
collective practices of drug manufacturers in over-marketing opioids,
which helped create the crisis. The exception is also based on opioids
not being “unavoidably unsafe,” as the learned intermediary doctrine
relies upon, in their most common use. Finally, Part III assesses the
effects of creating this exception on the health care industry.
Although exposing drug manufacturers to increased liability will carry
some negative ramifications, this Note argues that the exception
should still be instituted because those negative effects can be
alleviated by realistic changes to the treatment of pain.
I. THE OPIOID CRISIS AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY
DOCTRINE
In providing an overview of the opioid crisis and the learned
intermediary doctrine, this Part discusses how the opioid crisis
transpired, specifically examining the role of prescription opioids and
drug manufacturers in causing the crisis. Next, this Part discusses the
application of the learned intermediary doctrine, the policy
underlying the doctrine, and certain exceptions to the doctrine that
have been carved out previously.
A. The Opioid Crisis
Opioids are a class of drugs derived from the opium poppy that are
typically used to treat pain. 9 These drugs also react strongly with
pleasure receptors in humans and can be very addictive with
debilitating withdrawal effects. 10 Opioids come in a number of forms,
with three in particular contributing to the opioid crisis. The first and
most recent contributor is fentanyl. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid
most often used for treating severe pain (such as advanced cancer
pain) that is fifty times more potent than morphine. 11 In many cases,

9. Josh Katz, Short Answers to Hard Questions About the Opioid Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES:
THE
UPSHOT
(Aug.
10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/03/upshot/opioid-drug-overdoseepidemic.html [https://perma.cc/K8PL-76DX].
10. See SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE
EPIDEMIC 38–39 (2015) (“[N]o other molecule in nature provided such merciful pain
relief, then hooked humans so completely, and punished them so mercilessly for
wanting their freedom from it.”).
11. Fentanyl, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html
[https://perma.cc/2C8BAQPP].
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fentanyl is being laced into heroin and into counterfeit pills without
the user’s knowledge, causing users to intake far stronger opioids than
intended, leading to overdoses. 12 The second contributor is heroin, a
Schedule I drug. 13 While heroin has been around for over a
century, 14 more potent forms sold more cheaply and conveniently by
dealers from Xalisco, Mexico have led to an increase in usage. 15
The third contributor, and most relevant for this Note, is
prescription opioids. For much of the twentieth century, doctors were
hesitant to prescribe opioids to patients because of the fear of
addiction. 16 This attitude gradually changed in the 1970s as doctors
began prescribing opioids for cancer and terminally ill patients. 17 By
the 1980s, however, the floodgates began to open. In 1980, The New
England Journal of Medicine published a letter to the editor authored
by Jane Porter and Dr. Hershel Jick. 18 The letter claimed that of the
nearly 12,000 patients treated with opioids at a hospital, only four had
become addicted. 19 The letter did not provide any data on which
opioids were given or the dosages prescribed, 20 and the fact that these
patients were carefully overseen by their treating doctors was
overlooked. 21 The letter was not even a formal scientific study. 22
Nevertheless, the letter was cited in a number of influential scientific
studies on pain treatment, 23 which helped reinforce by the 1990s the
12. Katz, supra note 9.
13. Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drugscheduling [https://perma.cc/888F-TSNZ]. “Schedule I” refers to drugs that have “no
currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.” Id.
14. Heroin Overview: Origin and History, UNIV. OF ARIZ.: METHOIDE,
https://methoide.fcm.arizona.edu/infocenter/index.cfm?stid=174
[https://perma.cc/M2G4-KP4Z] (noting that heroin was first synthesized in 1874 and
produced commercially in 1898).
15. See QUINONES, supra note 10, at 19, 43–45 (describing the black tar heroin
being sold as more potent than other forms of heroin, and a “fast food-like” delivery
system that made heroin easy to acquire at a low cost).
16. Id. at 80.
17. Id.
18. Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Correspondence: Addiction Rare in Patients
Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123, 123 (1980).
19. Id.
20. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 16.
21. Id. at 107.
22. Id. at 108.
23. See, e.g., Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid
Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171, 183 n.38 (1986)
(citing Porter & Jick to support the claim that opioids could be prescribed with little
risk of addiction); see also QUINONES, supra note 10, at 107 (“Everybody heard it
everywhere. It was Porter and Jick. We [referring to the medical community] all
used it. We all thought it was gospel.”). In 2001, Time magazine called Porter & Jick
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claim that opioids were non-addictive. 24
In fact, this “pain
revolution” helped swing the pendulum far to the other side,
suggesting to physicians the idea that not only might opioids be safe
to treat chronic pain patients, but also that doctors had been
previously “undertreating” pain patients. 25 This shift in thinking led
to the emergence of blockbuster painkillers like OxyContin, which
was heavily promoted and prescribed 26 chiefly because it was thought
to not be addictive. 27
From these origins, the opioid crisis was born. Backed by the
aforementioned research, drug manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma
(“Purdue”), Cephalon, Inc. (“Cephalon”), Janssen Pharmaceuticals
(“Janssen”), Endo Health Solutions (“Endo”), and Insys
Therapeutics (“Insys”) began heavily manufacturing opioids. 28 To
foster sales of these drugs, manufacturers contributed substantial
funds to patient advocacy groups and professional societies including
the Academy of Integrative Pain Management and the National Pain
Foundation, groups which focused on chronic pain and opioid-related
issues. 29 For instance, from 2012 to 2017, Purdue, Janssen, Mylan
N.V., Depomed, Inc., and Insys contributed $9 million in total to
In turn, these advocacy
opioid-related advocacy groups. 30
organizations heavily promoted the use of prescription opioids.31
Manufacturers also relied on large pharmaceutical distributors,
including McKesson Corporation, Amerisource Bergen Corporation,
and Cardinal Health, Inc. to distribute their drugs. 32 As a result of
these marketing and distribution efforts by manufacturers, by 2015,
“a landmark study” that helped eliminate the “myth” of opioid addiction. See
QUINONES, supra note 10, at 108.
24. Id. at 109.
25. Id. at 95.
26. Mark A. Ford, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing Liability
for Off-Label Drug Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) (noting that Purdue
spent over $200 million marketing OxyContin in 1998, and that the drug became the
most prescribed painkiller in the nation soon after).
27. See QUINONES, supra note 10, at 132.
28. Complaint at 45–46, Rutherford County v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-cv00238 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2018) (showing table of opioid manufacturers and the
opioid drug they manufactured).
29. U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., FUELING AN
EPIDEMIC: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL TIES BETWEEN OPIOID MANUFACTURERS AND
THIRD PARTY ADVOCACY GROUPS 3–4 (2018).
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id. at 12.
32. U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., FUELING AN
EPIDEMIC: A FLOOD OF 1.6 BILLION DOSES OF OPIOIDS INTO MISSOURI AND THE
NEED FOR STRONGER DEA ENFORCEMENT 1 (2018).
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the number of opioids prescribed was enough for every American to
be medicated around the clock for three weeks. 33
Concurrently, because opioids were addictive despite “studies” to
the contrary, this surge in use was coupled with an increase in misuse
and tragedy. 34 Of the 97.5 million people who used painkillers in
2015, 12.5 million people misused them. 35 Further, drug distributors
often failed to meet their reporting obligations under the Controlled
Substances Act to “monitor and report suspicious orders under the
controlled substances act to the Drug Enforcement Agency.” 36 This
resulted in massive amounts of opioids being diverted — given from
the person to whom it was prescribed or from the pharmacy it was
sold to another person for illicit use — contributing to the crisis. 37
Other users simply switched from prescription opioids to heroin
because heroin was cheaper. 38 Regardless of the form, this misuse of
opioids exacted both a human and financial toll. Over 47,000 people
died from an opioid overdose in 2017, 39 and the opioid crisis could
claim a projected one million lives by 2020. 40 The crisis has cost the
United States over $500 billion per year attributable to criminal
justice measures, treating patients in intensive care wards in hospitals,
and lost productivity in businesses. 41

33. Opioid Prescribing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 6,
2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/opioids/infographic.html#infographic
[https://perma.cc/3VQC-V364]. Prescribing hit a peak in 2012, with 255 million
prescriptions issued at a rate of 81.3 prescriptions per 100 people. U.S. Prescribing
Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html [https://perma.cc/8NNWVLGJ].
34. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009).
35. Arthur Hughes et al., Prescription Drug Use and Misuse in the United States:
Results from the 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE
&
MENTAL
HEALTH
SERVS.
ADMIN.
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR2-2015/NSDUH-FFR22015.htm [https://perma.cc/M9XA-VNWG].
36. FUELING AN EPIDEMIC: A FLOOD OF 1.6 BILLION DOSES OF OPIOIDS INTO
MISSOURI AND THE NEED FOR STRONGER DEA ENFORCEMENT, supra note 32, at 1.
37. Id. at 4.
38. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 6.
39. Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 3.
40. Jerry Mitchell, With 175 Americans Dying a Day, What Are the Solutions to
the Opioid Epidemic?, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018, 10:29 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/29/175-americans-dyingday-what-solutions-opioid-epidemic/1074336001/ [https://perma.cc/NR5Z-2453].
41. Maria LaMagna, More Evidence that the Opioid Epidemic Is Only Getting
MARKETWATCH
(Aug.
16,
2018,
10:34
AM),
Worse,
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Although the opioid crisis has hit rural communities the hardest, it
has not left urban communities untouched. 42 On the contrary, the
opioid crisis has increasingly affected urban communities, with the
highest rate of increases in opioid overdoses between July 2016 and
September 2017 occurring in large metro areas (areas with a
population of 1 million or more and covering a major city). 43 In
Philadelphia, for instance, opioids caused 1,217 overdose deaths in
2017. 44 Philadelphia Health Commissioner Thomas Farley described
Philadelphia as “[a]n entire city floating on opioids.” 45 The rise of the
urban opioid crisis has been driven by heroin, and particularly heroin
cut with fentanyl, as both are more prevalent in urban markets than
prescription opioids. 46
The urban opioid crisis has especially taken a toll on black
communities in urban environments, who are now dying at a faster
rate than in suburban and rural areas. 47 The CDC found that
overdose deaths among black urbanites rose by 41% in 2016, 48 while
the Office of the Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. found that
opioid overdose deaths among black men between the ages of fortynine and sixty-nine increased by a whopping 245% between 2014 and
2017. 49 Whereas overdose deaths per 100,000 among blacks in rural
areas was 6.7% in 2016, it was 22.7% among blacks in urban areas,
which represented a drastic increase. 50 This is as compared to whites,

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-much-the-opioid-epidemic-costs-the-us2017-10-27 [https://perma.cc/634M-7XBZ].
42. Ahlishia Shipley, Opioid Crisis Affects All Americans, Rural and Urban,
USDA: BLOG (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2018/01/11/opioidcrisis-affects-all-americans-rural-and-urban [https://perma.cc/K2Z4-FR2N].
43. Corky Siemaszko, Large U.S. Cities See Big Jump in Deadly Opioid
Overdoses, CDC Data Shows, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:12 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/large-u-s-cities-seebig-jump-deadly-opioid-overdoses-n854041 [https://perma.cc/YL5D-YYWG].
44. Larry Eichel & Meagan Pharis, ‘No Silver Bullet’ for Opioid Crisis in
Philadelphia, Other Urban Areas, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 10, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/05/10/no-silverbullet-for-opioid-crisis-in-philadelphia-other-urban-areas
[https://perma.cc/9Q4G3E6V].
45. Id.
46. Siemaszko, supra note 43.
47. Marisa Peñaloza, The Opioid Crisis Is Surging in Black, Urban Communities,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Mar.
8,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/579193399/the-opioid-crisis-frightening-jump-toblack-urban-areas [https://perma.cc/28UK-5BJJ].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing charts).
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whose overdose deaths per 100,000 for urban and rural areas were
much closer (25.6% for urban, 19.6% for rural). 51
While most opioid-related deaths are now caused by heroin and
fentanyl, more than 40% of opioid overdose deaths in 2016 involved a
prescription opioid, 52 and experts agree that curbing the amount of
prescription opioids available is necessary to stopping the crisis. 53
This Note proposes to do exactly that by removing the learned
intermediary barrier to drug manufacturer liability, which will lead to
fewer prescription opioids being manufactured and distributed.
B. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
In tort law, manufacturers are typically held liable for any harms
caused by their products. However, the learned intermediary
doctrine is a noteworthy exception to this general rule. 54 Considered
by some to have been first applied in 1948 in Marcus v. Specific
Pharmaceuticals, 55 the doctrine holds that a drug manufacturer may
escape liability for injuries caused to a patient by the drug when the
manufacturer warns the prescribing physician of the dangers
associated with the drug. 56 In other words, the duty of the
manufacturer to warn in cases involving pharmaceuticals extends only
to the prescribing physician, not the patient. 57
The doctrine is rooted in two fundamental principles. 58 The first
principle is that because drug warnings are often complex and the
risks and benefits of a given medication are hard to gauge for each
individual patient, physicians are best suited to evaluate whether to
prescribe a given drug. 59 The rationale is that a patient’s physician,

51. Id. (citing charts).
52. Prescription Opioid Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html
[https://perma.cc/SS7P-RV7S].
53. Katz, supra note 9.
54. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th § 2[a] (1998).
55. Marcus v. Specific Pharms., Inc.,77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1948); see also
Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Kevin F. Calcagnie, Vioxx and the “Learned Intermediary”
Defense, 8 ANDREWS DRUG RECALL LITIG. REP. 7 1, Jan. 2005, at 2 (citing Marcus as
the first application of the learned intermediary doctrine).
56. See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467–68 (5th Cir. 1999).
57. Kane, supra note 54, at Introduction.
58. Other principles have been put forth, such as a reluctance by the courts to
intrude upon the doctor-patient relationship and an inability of drug manufacturers
to adequately communicate with patients. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734
A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999).
59. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a].
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unlike a drug manufacturer, is aware of a patient’s particular “needs
and susceptibilities.” 60 Thus, the physician is deemed to be the
“learned intermediary” between a drug manufacturer and a patient,61
and the physician is tasked with informing a patient of the various
risks and benefits associated with the drug so that the patient can
exercise informed consent. 62
The second principle is that prescription drugs are considered
“unavoidably unsafe.” 63 The premise here is that many drugs are
incapable of being made completely safe given the current state of
scientific knowledge. 64 However, because the benefits of a drug are
deemed to outweigh the risks associated with a drug, the drug is not
considered defective or unreasonably dangerous when accompanied
by proper warnings. 65 An example of this would be the Pasteur
treatment for rabies, which pairs the rather serious side effects of the
remedy with the substantial risk of death from the disease itself.66
Thus, the use and marketing of this treatment is justified,
notwithstanding the concomitant side effects and risks.
Although the learned intermediary doctrine is absolute in most
states, 67 some states have carved out limited exceptions. One
exception was created for direct-to-consumer advertising by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 68 In
Perez, the court found that the principles underlying the learned
intermediary doctrine were absent in direct-to-consumer
advertising. 69 Specifically, the court reasoned that (1) doctors had
less time to see patients and thus could not provide a thorough risk-

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
63. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a].
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
65. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a].
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
67. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 9:25 (4th ed. 2014).
68. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1260 (N.J. 1999). The Third
Restatement of Torts has also suggested such an exception might apply.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(“In certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or other health-care
provider has a much-diminished role as an evaluator or decisionmaker. In these
instances, it may be appropriate to impose on the manufacturer the duty to warn the
patient directly.”).
69. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
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benefit analysis for prescribing drugs, 70 (2) the multi-billion dollar
advertising budget of drug manufacturers undermined any claims that
drug manufacturers could not effectively communicate with
patients, 71 (3) patients “now enter physicians’ offices with
preconceived expectations about treatment because of information
obtained from DTC [direct-to-consumer] advertisements,” 72 and (4) a
policy protecting “the patient’s interest in reliable information
predominates over a policy that would insulate manufacturers.” 73 For
these reasons, the Perez court held that drug manufacturers had a
duty to warn patients when they directly marketed their products to
consumers. 74
Some courts have also recognized an exception when a drug
manufacturer excessively promotes a product.
In these
circumstances, the marketing for the drug is so extensive that the
warnings given by the manufacturer to physicians are rendered
meaningless, causing a physician to prescribe a drug when it would
otherwise be unwarranted. 75 For example, in Stevens v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 76 Parke, Davis was required to warn physicians that an
antibiotic carried a serious risk of causing bone marrow disease.77
Despite this, Parke, Davis attempted to circumvent these warnings
through marketing, such as by placing ads in physicians’ magazines,
distributing calendars that mentioned the benefits of the drug without
noting the serious side-effects, and having salespeople directly visit
physicians to promote the drug. 78 These marketing techniques caused
physicians to prescribe the antibiotic when they otherwise may not
have, 79 leading to Parke, Davis being held liable to the patient
because the warnings it had given physicians were nullified by its
marketing tactics. 80

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
2001).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 1255–56.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
See Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1030 (S.D. Ill.
507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 662.

Id.
Id. at 664.
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II. FASHIONING AN OPIOID EXCEPTION TO THE LEARNED
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
Part II argues that an exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine should be created for prescription opioids. This would allow
patients to hold drug manufacturers liable when a prescription opioid
causes an injury to the patient unless the manufacturer directly warns
the patient of the dangers of the drug. The exception should be
created because the opioid crisis has demonstrated the flaws inherent
in the learned intermediary doctrine. First, drug manufacturers did
not adequately warn physicians about the dangers of opioids, and
even if they had, concerted over-promotion of opioids diluted those
warnings. Second, prescription opioids are not “unavoidably unsafe”
for treating chronic, non-cancer pain because their risks outweigh
their benefits.
A. Drug Manufacturers Engaged in an Industry-Wide Practice of
Failing to Adequately Warn Physicians About Opioid Dangers, and
Rendered Warnings Were Made Moot Through Over-Promotion of
Opioids
As noted above, one principle underlying the learned intermediary
doctrine is that only physicians can adequately wade through the
complex warnings accompanying a drug to decide whether to
prescribe the drug to a patient. 81 However, this principle assumes
that the drug manufacturer gives physicians adequate warnings in the
first place. 82 In the case of opioids, drug manufacturers failed to
properly apprise physicians of the dangers associated with opioids,
and the manufacturers’ excessive marketing of these drugs rendered
any warnings that were given meaningless. Further, because these
tactics constituted an industry-wide practice, a more expansive
remedy in the form of an opioid exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine is justified.

1.

Drug Manufacturers Failed to Warn Physicians about the Risks
of Opioids

While the learned intermediary doctrine protects drug
manufacturers if they adequately warn a prescribing physician of the

81. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a].
82. See, e.g., Boehm v. Eli Lilly & Co., 747 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
manufacturer of an ‘unavoidably unsafe’ but beneficial prescription must make ‘an
adequate warning’ to prescribing physicians of the risks of adverse side effects.”).
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risks associated with a drug, 83 the marketing of OxyContin by Purdue
Pharma illustrates how drug manufacturers failed to adequately warn
physicians of the dangers of addiction linked to opioid painkillers.
Underlying Purdue’s marketing strategy were claims that OxyContin
was virtually non-addictive, 84 despite these claims not being
accurate. 85 Part of the training for Purdue’s sales representatives
consisted of teaching them that the risk of addiction was “less than
one percent,” per the Porter and Jick 86 study. 87 Purdue also focused
on marketing to primary care physicians with little pain-management
training, who were functioning in the time-strapped world of
managed care. 88 Thus, not only did these practitioners have
negligible experience to counteract the claims by Purdue, but pills
were also a particularly appealing solution for doctors who could only
devote only a few minutes to each patient. 89

2.

Drug Manufacturers Over-Promoted Opioid Painkillers,
Rendering any Warnings Meaningless

Compounding this lack of warning, Purdue undermined any
cautions given by over-promoting OxyContin. 90 To prove over-

83. See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365–66 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
84. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223.
85. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 127 (quoting a former Purdue sales manager,
who said: “They told us to say things like it is ‘virtually’ non-addicting. That’s what
we were instructed to do. It’s not right, but that’s what they told us to say . . . You’d
tell the doctor there is a study, but you wouldn’t show it to him.”); First Amended
Complaint at 14, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884cv-01808
(Mass.
Super.
Ct.
Jan.
31,
2019),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5715954-Massachusetts-AGO-AmendedComplaint-2019-01-31.html [https://perma.cc/5CUL-N7PT] (“Purdue always knew
that its opioids carry grave risks of addiction and death. Instead of being honest
about these risks, Purdue obscured them, including by falsely stating and implying
that ‘appropriate’ patients won’t get addicted.”).
86. Porter & Jick, supra note 18, at 123.
87. Id.; Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223.
88. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97; Van Zee, supra note 34, at 222.
89. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97–98 (noting doctors had increasingly less time
with their patients, that doctors were “making their money by churning patients
through their offices at a thirteen-minute clip,” and that “opioids helped a harried
doctor with what was now the largest drain on his time: chronic-pain patients”).
90. Typically, independent knowledge by a physician of dangers associated with a
drug can alleviate a manufacturer of liability as well. Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2007). However, a drug manufacturer can still be held
liable even if a physician knows of the dangers associated with a drug if the marketing
of the drug could foreseeably induce a physician to prescribe the drug when it was
otherwise not warranted. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 664 (Cal.
1973). As will be described more thoroughly in the main text, this is exactly what
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promotion, a plaintiff must present “individualized proof that such
over-promotion caused the physician to initiate or maintain the
prescription at issue.” 91 As noted earlier, over-promotion was found
in Stevens, where the court determined that Parke, Davis used
giveaways such as calendars, physicians’ reference articles, and
personal visits by salesmen that ignored the side effects caused by the
drug to undermine any warnings Parke, Davis was required to give. 92
Purdue engaged in similar and even more aggressive tactics. First,
Purdue provided giveaways, such as OxyContin-branded “fishing
hats, stuffed toys, golf balls, pens with charts converting a patient’s
dosage in other pills to OxyContin,” message paper pads, and even a
swing jazz CD that “urged listeners to ‘Swing in the Right Direction
with OxyContin.’” 93 According to the DEA, no company had ever
used branded merchandise as extensively to market a Schedule II 94
drug. 95
Second, Purdue hosted more than forty all-expenses paid national
pain-management and speaker training conferences attended by some
5000 physicians, pharmacists, and nurses recruited and trained to be
speakers for Purdue and OxyContin. 96 These types of conferences
have been shown to influence the prescribing patterns of physicians. 97
Purdue also focused on Continuing Medical Education (CME)
programs, funding more than 20,000 CME programs that promoted
the benefits of OxyContin. 98 CMEs essentially became marketing
tools, with drug manufacturers wining and dining physicians, and
featuring speakers picked by drug manufacturers to promote specific
drugs. 99 The influence of drug manufacturers on CMEs became so
problematic that new rules were established to stymie this
behavior. 100

occurred with the marketing of opioids. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 132 (“[Purdue
gave] a very effective presentation . . . It really did make you doubt your feelings
about what you’d been taught [about opioids] in medical school.”).
91. Patterson v. AstraZeneca, L.P., 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2012).
92. Stevens, 507 P.2d at 662.
93. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 134.
94. Id. at 135 (“Schedule II is a federal designation for drugs with accepted
medical uses, but a high potential for abuse resulting in dependency.”).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 135; Van Zee, supra note 34, at 221.
97. See Van Zee, supra note 34, at 221.
98. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 135–36.
99. Id. at 135.
100. Id.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

697

Third, Purdue made extensive use of video marketing. In 1998,
Purdue sent out a non-FDA video to doctors, entitled: I Got My Life
Back: Patients in Pain Tell Their Story, which not only showed
patients claiming that OxyContin had greatly benefited them, but also
reinforced the “less than one percent” claim about opioid
addiction. 101 The claims about quality of life improvement were
completely unsubstantiated. 102 In fact, three of the seven patients
featured in I Got My Life Back became opioid addicts, two of whom
died as active opioid abusers. 103 The video did not portray these
users as addicts, however. On the contrary, I Got My Life Back made
the bold claim that patients who appeared to be addicted were
suffering from “pseudoaddiction.” 104 “Pseudoaddiction is relief
seeking behavior mistaken as drug addiction” 105 and helped embed in
physicians the idea that there was no limit to how many opioids they
could prescribe because the patient could never really become
addicted. 106 These marketing strategies reinforced the idea that
OxyContin should be “prescribed ‘for everything,’” rather than only
for the specific uses on its FDA-approved label. 107
Purdue’s marketing did not stop with doctors. Purdue also sent out
a video, From One Pain Patient to Another: Advice from Patients
Who Have Found Relief, which was intended for doctors’ waiting
rooms. 108 The video urged patients to discuss their pain with their
doctors and aimed to assuage patient concerns about taking opioids,
again citing the “less than one percent” addiction rate claim. 109 These
videos also came at a time when patients were becoming more

101. Id. at 136.
102. Id.
103. See John Fauber & Ellen Gabler, What Happened to the Poster Children of
OxyContin?,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL,
Sept.
8,
2012,
http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/what-happened-to-the-posterchildren-of-oxycontin-r65r0lo-169056206.html/ [https://perma.cc/5ASQ-V86H].
104. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Opioids, YOUTUBE (HBO television
broadcast
Oct.
23,
2016),
https://youtu.be/5pdPrQFjo2o?t=10m40s
[https://perma.cc/EV4A-6KPQ] (showing footage from I Got My Life Back in which
a doctor discusses the concept of “pseudoaddiction”).
105. Id. (quoting Dr. Alan Spanos from I Got My Life Back); see also QUINONES,
supra note 10, at 109 (“Usually, a patient demanding ever-higher doses of a drug
would be proof that the drug wasn’t working. But in opiate pain treatment, it was
taken as proof that the doctor hadn’t yet prescribed enough.”).
106. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 110.
107. Ford, supra note 26, at 444–45.
108. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 136–37.
109. Id.

698

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

comfortable demanding drugs for treatment. 110 Purdue’s marketing
program additionally included targeting doctors who prescribed
opioids at the highest rate, paying large bonuses to sales
representatives based on sales of OxyContin, and a coupon program
that provided patients with a free seven to thirty-day supply of
OxyContin. 111
In 2001 alone, Purdue spent $200 million on an extensive
marketing campaign, 112 which spurred OxyContin sales from $44
million in 1996 to approximately $3 billion between 2001 and 2002.113
This record of corporate behavior constitutes the “individualized
proof” required to satisfy the over-promotion exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine that would normally preclude liability
for drug manufacturers when a doctor is prescribing the medication.
Moreover, the video intended for physicians’ waiting rooms arguably
fulfills the direct-to-consumer exception established by Perez.114
Specifically, the videos demonstrated that drug manufacturers could
directly reach consumers 115 and that patients would enter their
doctor’s office with preconceived notions of the treatment they
should receive, thus undermining the doctor-patient relationship. 116
While Purdue’s OxyContin campaign is the most publicized
example of opioid over-promotion, it is not the only example. In
2008, Cephalon agreed to a $425 million settlement to resolve claims
of off-label marketing 117 for its drug, Actiq, in violation of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act. 118 Actiq is a “transmucosal immediaterelease fentanyl” (“TIRF”) opioid 119 that had been approved for
110. Id. at 96.
111. Id. at 133–34 (noting that Purdue paid $40 million in bonuses related to
OxyContin sales in 2001); Van Zee, supra note 34, at 222.
112. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 221.
113. Id. at 223.
114. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1263 (N.J. 1999).
115. Id. at 1255–56.
116. Id. at 1260.
117. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label”, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Feb.
5,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/other/offlabel/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/7RT52WHG] (defining “off label use” as “using an FDA-approved drug for an
unapproved use”). Hence, “off label marketing” would be marketing approved drugs
for unapproved uses.
118. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, to
Pay $425 Million and Enter Plea to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Marketing
(Sept. 29, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-civ860.html [https://perma.cc/4DAA-BU7R] [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
119. Thomas Sullivan, FDA: Transmucosal Immediate-Release Fentanyl (TIRF)
REMS, POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 2018), http://www.policymed.com/2012/01/fda-
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treating pain in opioid-tolerant cancer patients. 120 However, between
2001 and 2006, Actiq was marketed for treating other ailments, such
as migraines and generic injuries, even in those patients who were not
Cephalon did this by specifically targeting
opioid-tolerant. 121
physicians other than oncologists (including general practitioners,
much like Purdue) 122 and training its sales force to stress that “pain is
pain” in contravention of an FDA label restriction limiting usage to
only treating cancer pain. 123 Cephalon also utilized direct physicianto-salesperson contact and funded CME programs. 124
Another more recent example is that of Insys and its drug, Subsys,
which like Actiq is a TIRF opioid approved for treating breakthrough
pain (severe pain that occurs in patients already medicated with
painkillers) in cancer patients. 125 The Subsys marketing plan had
several features. First, starting with the launch of Subsys in 2012,
Insys spent $10 million funding speaker programs. 126 Insys paid
doctors hundreds of thousands of dollars to speak at these
engagements on the condition that they would prescribe or continue
prescribing Subsys, with the highest paid speakers each being paid
more than $200,000. 127 Insys even attracted one doctor to be a
speaker by hiring an exotic dancer to woo him; this doctor ended up
accounting for 58% of Subsys’s prescriptions in Illinois over a threeyear period. 128 As a result of this arrangement, Subsys sales increased

transmucosal-immediate-release-fentanyl-tirf-rems.html
[https://perma.cc/P5VHSZSE]. These fentanyl-based opioids are different than OxyContin, which contains
large doses of oxycodone, which is molecularly similar to heroin. QUINONES, supra
note 10, at 124. This is further contrasted with other types of opioids such as Vicodin
and Percocet, which combine small doses of oxycodone with acetaminophen (the
pain-killing ingredient in Tylenol). Id. at 125.
120. DOJ Press Release, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. See supra Section II.A.1 (“Purdue also focused on marketing to primary care
physicians with little pain-management training . . . ”).
123. DOJ Press Release, supra note 118.
124. Id.; see also supra Section II.A.2 (“CMEs essentially became marketing tools,
with drug manufacturers wining and dining physicians, and featuring speakers picked
by drug manufacturers to promote specific drugs.”).
125. Evan Hughes, The Pain Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES: THE MONEY ISSUE (May 2,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/02/magazine/money-issue-insysopioids-kickbacks.html [https://perma.cc/D6PT-VGCD].
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Nate Raymond, North Carolina Accuses Drugmaker Insys of
Scheme to Push Opioid, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2017, 11:40 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/north-carolina-accuses-drugmakerinsys-of-scheme-to-push-opioid-idUSKBN1EF292 [https://perma.cc/GK7Z-KA8M].
128. Hughes, supra note 125.
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by more than 1,000% between 2012 and 2013. 129 According to federal
prosecutors, all of this amounted to a kickback scheme, 130 a charge to
which one former Subsys speaker from Rhode Island recently pled
guilty. 131
Second, Insys specifically targeted doctors who wrote the most
prescriptions. 132 At the top of Insys’s list — the “highest decile” —
were doctors that did not specialize in cancer pain. This strategy
resembles Purdue’s and Cephalon’s targeting of primary care
physicians. It was common knowledge in the industry that sales
representatives should target pain doctors and other nononcologists, 133 because doctors can write prescriptions for off-label
usage at their own discretion, 134 and doctors lacking much experience
with these types of medications 135 are presumably more easily
influenced to do so. As a result of these efforts, as of September
2016, only 4% of Subsys prescriptions were written by oncologists,
and only about 20% of patients receiving Subsys actually suffered
from breakthrough cancer pain — the only pain Subsys was approved
to treat. 136
Finally, Insys fraudulently obtained insurance reimbursement for
Subsys. Due to the risks associated with the drug, coverage
reimbursement required prior authorization and insurers would only
pay for Subsys when it was used to treat breakthrough cancer pain. 137
Using a team of “prior authorization specialists,” Insys
representatives would call insurers, pretend to be from a doctor’s
office (with blocked caller ID to disguise their true identities), and tell
the insurer that the patient had breakthrough cancer pain when the
patient in fact did not. 138 These tactics caused the approval rate of

129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Nate Raymond, Rhode Island Doctor Pleads Guilty to Opioid Kickback
Scheme Related to Insys, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2017, 2:48 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/rhode-island-doctor-pleads-guilty-toopioid-kickback-scheme-related-to-insys-idUSKBN1CU2SA
[https://perma.cc/HS4G-SQ78].
132. Hughes, supra note 125.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97.
136. Hughes, supra note 125.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM.,
FUELING AN EPIDEMIC: INSYS THERAPEUTICS AND THE SYSTEMATIC MANIPULATION
OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 8–10 (2017) (analyzing the transcript of such a call from
an Insys sales representative to an insurance company representative).

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

701

Subsys to surge to 87% by 2013. 139 All of these tactics, taken
together, constitute over-promotion by Insys. 140

3.

Drug Manufacturers’ Engagement in Industry-Wide Marketing
Practices Justifies the Creation of an Opioid Exception to the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine

Although the actions of Purdue, Cephalon, Insys, and other opioid
manufacturers would be sufficient to prevent each individually from
asserting the learned intermediary doctrine on failure to warn or
over-promotion grounds, these sales tactics constituted an industrywide practice, which warrants the establishment of an opioid
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. This position is
supported by the reasoning behind the joint liability doctrine, which
allows multiple tortfeasors to be held liable for the full amount of
damages caused by their conduct. 141
In the seminal case of Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,142
Judge Jack Weinstein discussed the concept of joint liability in finding
that the manufacturers of blasting caps could be tried together on the
issue of joint liability. 143 First, Judge Weinstein outlined the elements
of joint liability: “(1) causing harm (2) by cooperative or concerted
activities (3) which violated a legal standard of care.” 144 Next, the
decision described three major policy reasons underlying joint
liability:
The first is the problem of joint or group control of risk: the need to
deter hazardous behavior by groups or multiple defendants as well
as by individuals. The second is the problem of enterprise liability:
the policy of assigning the foreseeable costs of an activity to those in
the most strategic position to reduce them. The third is the problem
of fairness with respect to burden of proof: the desire to avoid
denying recovery to an innocent injured plaintiff because proof of

139. Hughes, supra note 125.
140. Markland v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1322 (M.D. Fla.
2017) (citing plaintiff’s argument that the learned intermediary doctrine should not
“be applied in this case due to Insys’ aggressive over promotion of Subsys”). The
Court did not reach this issue because it found plaintiff’s claims to be preempted by
federal law. Id. at 1331 n.6.
141. See Tilcon Capaldi, Inc., v. Feldman, 249 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2001) (defining
“joint liability”).
142. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
143. Id. at 381.
144. Id. at 371.
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Judge Weinstein also delved into what is considered “cooperative
or concerted activities.” The decision held that “cooperative or
concerted” activity does not mean that an express business venture
must exist; “all that is required is that there shall be a common design
or understanding.” 146 Indeed, “The variety of business and property
relationships in which joint control of risk has been found
demonstrates the flexibility of the doctrine. Liability is not limited to
particular formal modes of cooperation, nor to illegal or grossly
To this end, plaintiffs can show that
negligent activities.” 147
defendants jointly controlled a risk by “submit[ting] evidence that
defendants, acting independently, adhered to an industry-wide
standard or custom.” 148 Finally, although Judge Weinstein also stated
that “the existence of industry-wide standards or practices alone will
not support, in all circumstances, the imposition of joint liability,”149
he also articulated, “[T]he point [of joint liability] is not only that the
damage is caused by multiple actors, but that the sole feasible way of
anticipating costs or damages and devising practical remedies is to
consider the activities of a group.” 150
These principles offer a theory of joint liability that may be applied
to opioid drug manufacturers. Per the foregoing analysis, 151 the
marketing practices of Purdue, Cephalon, and Insys considerably
overlap.
First, all three companies targeted non-oncologist
physicians, especially primary care and pain doctors and particularly
those doctors known for heavy prescribing practices. 152 Second, each
of these companies marketed off-label uses for their drugs. 153 Finally,
each company made extensive use of educational seminar-type
engagements, such as CMEs and speaker series. 154 The confluence
and intention of these three strategies indicate that these types of
actions were “industry-wide standards and practices.”

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2.
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Further, a finding of joint liability based on the marketing practices
of Purdue, Cephalon, and Insys (among others) fulfills the three
policy goals of the joint liability doctrine. As previously explained,
joint control of risk is “the need to deter hazardous behavior by
groups or multiple defendants as well as by individuals.” 155 It is
necessary to deter drug manufacturers from excessively marketing
opioids, thereby reducing the number of opioids in circulation. The
second consideration is enterprise liability, which is “the policy of
assigning the foreseeable costs of an activity to those in the most
strategic position to reduce them.” 156 Drug manufacturers are not
only the entities most in control of producing and distributing opioids
but are also the only entities in control of their marketing protocols.
As drug companies have previously circumvented government limits
on marketing, 157 drug companies are thus in the most strategic
position to reduce the foreseeable costs of their activities. Finally, as
to fairness with respect to the burden of proof, patients were never
intended to see the majority of marketing materials distributed by
drug companies. The proof of causation, therefore, is largely within
the control of drug manufacturers because patients must rely largely
on materials within drug manufacturers’ possession to prove their
cases.
It may be true that data showing which types of patients were
prescribed opioids may disclose which drug manufacturers are
responsible for specific injuries. 158 Thus, unlike the fact pattern in
Hall, the drug manufacturers here are not unidentifiable parties.
However, the purpose of joint liability is to reduce the possibility of
risk and spread costs by considering the activities of individuals as a
group. 159 Going after only one drug manufacturer will not end the
opioid crisis. To illustrate, the conduct of Insys occurred five years
after Purdue pled guilty in 2007 to criminal charges about

155. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 371.
156. Id.
157. DOJ Press Release, supra note 118 (describing how Cephalon circumvented
FDA limits on off-label marketing); Hughes, supra note 125 (describing how Insys
circumvented FDA limits on off-label prescribing).
158. What Information Does an Electronic Health Record (EHR) Contain?,
HEALTHIT.GOV (Mar. 17, 2013), https://www.healthit.gov/faq/what-informationdoes-electronic-health-record-ehr-contain [https://perma.cc/8AUN-QBJB].
159. See Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378 (holding that joint liability “would represent
rather the law’s traditional function of reviewing the risk and cost decisions inherent
in industry-wide safety practices”).
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misrepresenting the abusive potential of OxyContin. 160 In other
words, even if one drug manufacturer is held liable for opioid-related
conduct, another may spring up, and the conduct of each company
only worsens the opioid crisis. Further, despite criminal penalties,
Since a 2007
Purdue has continued to peddle opioids. 161
Massachusetts judgment against it, Purdue has sold “more than
70,000,000 [70 million] doses of opioids in Massachusetts,” collecting
“a revenue of $500,000,000 [$500 million].” 162 Only by considering
the actions of drug manufacturers as a group and imposing liability on
industry-wide practices collectively can proper deterrence be
achieved. 163 Accordingly, the policy justifications for joint liability
mandate the creation of an opioid exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine.
B. Prescription Opioids Are Not “Unavoidably Unsafe” for Treating
Chronic, Non-Cancer Pain
The other major principle underlying the learned intermediary
doctrine is that prescription drugs are “unavoidably unsafe” — that is,
the drugs are not considered unreasonably dangerous when
accompanied by proper warnings because the benefits associated with
these drugs outweigh the costs. 164 As far as prescription opioids are
concerned, this premise may be true when the drugs are used to treat
acute temporary pain or pain in cancer patients. 165 The efficacy of
treating chronic, non-cancer pain with opioids, however, is far less
certain. 166 Because non-cancer patients make up the overwhelming
majority of opioid users, as discussed infra, the inquiry should be
whether opioids are unavoidably unsafe when treating chronic, noncancer pain.
160. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y.
TIMES (May 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drugweb.html [https://perma.cc/6ED9-PJ6L].
161. First Amended Complaint at 12, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.
1884-cv-01808 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2019) (alleging that since a 2007 judgment
against it, Purdue visited Massachusetts prescribers and pharmacists “more than
150,000 times”).
162. Id. at 8.
163. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378 (holding that in certain circumstances, joint liability
is “the only feasible method of ascertaining risks, imposing safeguards and spreading
costs is through joint liability or other methods of joint risk control”).
164. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a].
165. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223 (noting that the science supporting treating
acute and cancer pain with opioids is “robust”).
166. Id. (noting “there is still much controversy in medicine about the use of
opioids for chronic non–cancer-related pain”).
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Some courts have held that comment k to section 402 of the Second
Restatement of Torts 167 – which gave birth to the concept of
“unavoidably unsafe” — should always apply to prescription drugs so
long as they are accompanied by proper warnings. 168 Other courts
have suggested a case-by-case inquiry as to whether a prescription
drug is unavoidably unsafe. 169 In Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 170
for example, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that “[comment k]
contemplates a weighing of the benefit of the product against the
risk,” and that “this weighing process should consider the value of the
benefit, the seriousness of the risk, and the likelihood of both.”171
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court in Belle Bonfils Memorial
Blood Bank v. Hansen 172 held that for a drug to be classified as
“unavoidably unsafe,” “the product’s utility must greatly outweigh
the risk created by its use; the risk must be a known one; the
product’s benefits must not be achievable in another manner; and the
risk must be unavoidable under the present state of knowledge.”173
The Hansen court also held that the “benefit should extend to the
vast majority of the users of the product.” 174
Even the Third Restatement of Torts seems to have walked back
the approach of comment k. In section 6, the Third Restatement
states the following:
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due
to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug
or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients. 175

Under these frameworks, prescription opioids fail to meet the
definition of unavoidably unsafe for treating chronic, non-cancer
pain. Under the Toner standard, “the value” of a drug’s benefits are

167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
168. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988) (holding a
drug manufacturer “is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so
long as the drug was . . . accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities”).
169. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984)
(“[W]e perceive no justification for giving all prescription drug manufacturers a
blanket immunity from strict liability and design defect claims under comment k.”).
170. 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987).
171. Id. at 306.
172. 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983).
173. Id. at 122.
174. Id. at 123.
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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weighed against “the seriousness” of its risks and “the likelihood of
both” occurring to determine whether the drug is “unavoidably
unsafe.” 176 Prescription opioids theoretically provide the benefit of
pain relief. 177 However, whether opioids in fact provide pain relief is
contestable. Four-week studies concerning opioid treatment have
shown patients to have “statistically significant but small to modest
improvement in pain relief with no consistent improvement in
physical functioning.” 178 Longer-term pain relief is even more
unclear, 179 as are the effects of these drugs on quality of life.180
Further, these benefits do not outweigh the serious side effects caused
by opioids, including hyperalgesia (increased susceptibility to pain),
respiratory depression, constipation, hormonal effects (e.g., decreased
libido), effects on the immune system (at least in immunocompromised persons, such as HIV patients), and addiction. 181
Although a number of side effects caused by opioids disappear with
continued use, constipation and hormonal effects can persist
indefinitely. 182 The risk of opioid abuse has also been measured to be
as high as 45%, while the risk of opioid addiction 183 has been assessed
to reach as high as 50%, depending on the patient population
studied. 184 Prescription opioids have also been linked to more
overdose deaths than illicit drugs such as cocaine 185 and are the most
common types of prescription drugs that are diverted. 186 The risk of
prescription opioid abuse has also been coupled with the use of
heroin. Studies have shown that, between 2008 and 2010, among

176. Toner, 732 P.2d at 306.
177. Jane C. Ballantyne, Opioids for Chronic Nonterminal Pain, 99 S. MED. J. 1245,
1246 (2006) (“[C]linical observation suggests that chronic pain states are, in fact,
relieved by opioid treatment.”).
178. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223 (citing various studies).
179. Id.; see also Ballantyne, supra note 177, at 1246 (“The question of whether
analgesic efficacy and other benefits of chronic opioid therapy can be maintained
over years rather than months remains unanswered.”).
180. Ballantyne, supra note 177, at 1248.
181. Id. at 1248–49.
182. Id.
183. “Drug abuse” is the overuse of a drug without becoming physically dependent
on it. “Drug addiction” requires physical dependence. See What Is the Difference
Between Abuse and Addiction?, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Aug. 13, 2012),
https://www.everydayhealth.com/addiction/experts-difference-between-substanceabuse-and-drug-addiction.aspx [https://perma.cc/RQY7-B8E9].
184. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223.
185. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2017 NATIONAL DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 25 (2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DIR040-17_2017-NDTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YQU-YQ57].
186. Id. at 33.
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people who used both prescription opioids and heroin, 77.4%
reported using prescription opioids before transitioning to heroin. 187
The prevalence of negative side effects coupled with the risks of
addiction, abuse, and transitioning to heroin outweigh the arguable
efficacy of using opioids to treat long-term chronic pain. This
balancing is further supported by the FDA’s recent decision to
remove Opana ER, an extended-release opioid, 188 from the market
because “the benefits of the drug may no longer outweigh its
costs.” 189 Based on this evidence, opioid painkillers fail to meet the
Toner standard for being unavoidably unsafe because their side
effects outweigh the alleged benefits.
Under the Hansen standard, prescription opioids would also not be
considered unavoidably unsafe. Hansen, also weighs the costs and
benefits of a drug, focusing on (1) whether “the product’s utility
greatly outweigh[s]” its risks; (2) whether “the risk is a known one”;
(3) whether the product’s benefits are “achievable in another
manner”; (4) whether the risk is “unavoidable under the present state
of knowledge”; and (5) whether the benefit “extend[s] to the vast
majority of the users of the product.” 190 As demonstrated supra, the
risks associated with prescription opioids outweigh the benefits for
the treatment of long-term chronic pain. Bolstering this assertion,
opioids are not a first-line treatment for chronic pain, and there are
non-opioid treatments that can provide relief while being
demonstrably safer. 191 In other words, the benefits of opioid
treatment are achievable in another manner without the dangerous

187. Wilson M. Compton et al., Relationship Between Nonmedical PrescriptionOpioid Use and Heroin Use, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 154, 156 (2016) (citing studies).
188. There are various types of opioid painkillers. The class Ocuna ER (as well as
OxyContin) belongs to is called “long-acting” or “extended release” opioids. These
opioids slowly send the drug into the body over several hours, as opposed to all at
once. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 124. In theory, this made extended release opioids
less addictive. Id. at 85. Ironically, it has been shown that extended release opioids
are more prone to abuse and overdose. Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs:

Variation Among States in Prescribing Opioid Pain Relievers and Benzodiazepines –
United States, 2012, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 563, 563 (2014).

189. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Requests Removal of Opana
ER
for
Risks
Related
to
Abuse
(June
8,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm562401.htm
[https://perma.cc/299B-945M].
190. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122–23 (Colo.
1983).
191. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NON-OPIOID TREATMENTS FOR
CHRONIC
PAIN
1–2
(2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/nonopioid_treatments-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87WB-W4BK].
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side effects. Furthermore, as non-cancer patients made up 86% of the
total opioid market in 1999, 192 the majority of prescription opioid
users take a drug whose costs outweigh its benefits. Even if the risk
involving opioids is known and unavoidable, opioids would still fail to
meet the Hansen standard.
Finally, opioids fail to classify as unavoidably unsafe under the
Third Restatement approach. The Third Restatement asks if “the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits”
such that reasonable healthcare providers would not prescribe the
drug. 193
Again, as noted above, the risks of opioids outweigh the benefits in
terms of treating long-term, chronic pain. Moreover, it is true that
cancer patients and those with acute pain do benefit from opioid
treatment, which means doctors would prescribe opioids for at least
two classes of patients, satisfying an aspect of the Third Restatement
approach. However, as explained supra, this group represents a
minority of the opioid market, and “[i]t does not serve society that an
unavoidably unsafe product, which has occasional or factious benefit,
should enjoy insulation from strict liability in tort when the product’s
predominant effects are detrimental to individual and public
safety.” 194 Thus, opioids are not unavoidably unsafe under the Third
Restatement approach.
In treating long-term, chronic patients with opioid painkillers, the
risks outweigh the benefits for most patients. As a result, opioids fail
to meet the standards of several accepted balancing tests for
determining which drugs are unavoidably unsafe. Accordingly,
because opioids are not unavoidably unsafe for treating long-term,
chronic pain, an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine
should be created for opioids.
III. THE EFFECTS OF CREATING THE OPIOID EXCEPTION
TO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
By exposing drug manufacturers to more liability, creating the
opioid exception will impose a higher level of accountability on said
manufacturers, which will, in turn, increase the cost of opioid drugs

192. See Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223.
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
194. Sidney H. Willig, The Comment K Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict
Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545, 545 (1978).
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and decrease their availability. 195 Drug manufacturers would also be
required to directly and adequately warn patients about the dangers
of opioids. 196 Drug manufacturers could do this by clearly stating the
risks of addiction on drug labels and in marketing materials addressed
to patients. 197 In theory, restricting the flow of prescriptions opioids
would help alleviate the crisis. However, restricting the flow of
prescription opioids might create additional problems.
A. The Problem of Pre-Existing Chronic, Non-Cancer Pain Patients
First, restricting the flow of opioids will not stop patients who have
already become dependent on opioids from being addicted; that is to
say, a lack of opioids will not cure pre-existing addiction. Rather,
restricting the flow may deter future addiction, but pre-existing
addicts, with fewer prescription opioids available and those that are
available becoming more expensive than before 198 will be pushed
towards cheaper opiates such as heroin. 199 However, many of these
people resorted to opioids in the first place because they had no other
way to deal with their pain. 200 In the case of chronic, non-cancer pain,
that scenario does not have to be.
One promising approach to treating chronic pain without relying
on opioids involves multi-disciplinary treatment. As an illustration,
the Center for Pain Relief at the University of Washington Medical

195. Kent Durning, No Pain No Gain?! Who Will Make the Greatest Sacrifices in
Curbing Opioid Analgesic Diversion and Abuse?, 93 KY. L.J. 199, 234 (2004).
196. Jennifer A. Guidea & Shana E. Russo, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine:
A Retrospective Review to the Present, REED SMITH LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRY

GROUP PRESENTATION 22,
https://www.reedsmith.com/-/media/files/events/2014/02/reed-smithteleseminar/files/presentation-materials/fileattachment/the-learned-intermediarydoctrine—22714—presenta.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NPA5-Z849].
197. The current OxyContin label, for instance, refers patients to a “Medication
Guide.”
See, e.g., OxyContin, DRUGS LIBRARY, http://www.drugslibrary.com/drugs/oxycontin_bfdfe235.html
[https://perma.cc/KCB4-QKZZ]
(featuring labels). A more effective warning would be to actually note the risk of
addiction and other negative effects of OxyContin directly on the package in large,
clear font, much like with cigarettes. Compare id., with Surgeon General’s Warning
WIKIMEDIA
COMMONS
(Jan.
28,
2017,
2:01
PM),
Cigarettes,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Surgeon_General%27s_warning_cigarettes.j
pg [https://perma.cc/MW9X-2Z8K].
198. Durning, supra note 195, at 234.
199. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 6.
200. Hughes et al., supra note 35 (stating that 62.6% of people who abused
prescription opioids in 2015 did so to relieve pain).

710

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

School has adopted a “bio-psycho-social” approach to pain relief,
using occupational therapists, physical therapists, social workers, and
others to treat pain, and teaching patients medical and life strategies
to control pain through exercise and maintaining a healthy diet.201
These types of programs have been shown to improve psychological
and physical function in patients, 202 even more so than conventional
medical treatments. 203 For instance, patients who undertake multidisciplinary pain treatment are almost twice as likely to return to
work as patients treated with only one medical discipline. 204 The
CDC is supportive of these treatments as well, stating that opioids are
“not the first-line therapy for [non-cancer, palliative, or end-of-life]
chronic pain,” and recommending a number of non-opioid treatments
that “can provide relief to those suffering from chronic pain, and are
safer.” 205 The National Institutes of Health has also endorsed a
multi-disciplinary approach, stating that the “best practice models for
chronic pain management require a multidisciplinary approach
similar to that recommended for other chronic complex illnesses such
as depression, dementia, eating disorders, or diabetes.” 206 The
National Institutes of Health has also noted that “[r]esearch
demonstrates that [pain] can be managed successfully using an
interdisciplinary team-based approach to care (e.g. medicine,
psychology, nursing, pharmacy, social work).” 207 However, there are
several reasons why this method is not used more often.
201. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 86.
202. Jaime Guzmán et al., Multidisciplinary Rehabilitation for Chronic Low Back
Pain: Systematic Review, 322 BMJ 1511, 1511 (2001) (finding evidence that “intensive
multidisciplinary biopsychosocial rehabilitation with functional restoration reduces
pain and improves function in patients with chronic low back pain”); Mark P. Jensen
et al., Correlates of Improvement in Multidisciplinary Treatment of Chronic Pain, 62
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 172, 172 (1994).
203. Herta Flor et al., Efficacy of Multidisciplinary Pain Treatment Centers: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 49 PAIN 221, 225 (1992); Luca Scascighini et al.,

Multidisciplinary Treatment for Chronic Pain: A Systematic Review of Interventions
and Outcomes, 47 RHEUMATOLOGY 670, 676 (2008) (finding multidisciplinary
programs are more effective “than standard medical treatment”).
204. See Flor et al., supra note 203, at 226; see also Anders Norlund et al.,

Multidisciplinary Interventions: Review of Studies of Return to Work After
Rehabilitation for Low Back Pain, 41 J. REHABILITATIVE MED. 115, 120 (2009)

(finding that multidisciplinary treatment has a “significant effect” on return to work
for “people with low back pain who are on sick leave for longer than 4 weeks”).
205. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 191, at 1.
206. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PATHWAYS TO PREVENTION WORKSHOP: THE ROLE
OF
OPIOIDS IN THE TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN 16 (2014),
https://prevention.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/programs/p2p/ODPPainPanel
StatementFinal_10-02-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5KB-4SYX].
207. Id.
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Despite the Impediments to Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to
Pain Treatment, It Still Represents an Effective Alternative to
Opioids

There are three main impediments to multi-disciplinary approaches
to pain treatment. The first is a “quick fix” mentality among patients
that is adverse to the lengthy therapy of multi-disciplinary
treatment. 208 The second impediment is that not all areas of the
country have access to multi-disciplinary treatment programs. 209
Finally, the third is the fact that many traditional medical insurers do
not cover these types of programs. As a result of the managed care
movement, health insurers began cutting costs and reducing the types
and amounts of reimbursable services. 210 Included among the “cuts”
were aspects of multidisciplinary treatment that were not strictly
“medical” (components which made up a substantial portion of
multidisciplinary treatment), 211 because pills were more convenient
and less costly. 212
Although there is no “quick fix” to the problem of a “quick fix”
mentality among patients, the rationale of insurance companies is
misguided. Studies have shown multi-disciplinary treatments to result
in a 43% savings in disability payments (estimated by some
investigations to result in billions of dollars to third parties) 213 and an
estimated $184 million savings in medical and surgical expenses. 214 A
study done by Daisha J. Cipher, et al. demonstrated that patients who
were treated only with pharmacological treatments imposed the
highest costs to the healthcare system as compared to patients who
received both pharmacological and cognitive behavioral treatment
because their condition deteriorated after treatment. 215 In response
to this kind of data, insurance companies should be incentivized to
subsidize multi-disciplinary treatment as a proven strategy to cut or
contain costs associated with chronic pain.

208. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 87.
209. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Opioids, supra note 104 (showing
footage of an interview with a doctor stating that many rural areas, which have been
the hardest hit by the opioid crisis, do not have access to alternative treatments).
210. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97.
211. See id. at 87.
212. See id. at 253.
213. See Flor et al., supra note 203, at 227.
214. Daisha J. Cipher et al., Cost-Effectiveness and Health Care Utilization in a
Multidisciplinary Pain Center: Comparison of Three Treatment Groups, 8 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. MED. SETTINGS 237, 238 (2001).
215. Id. at 243–44.
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Drug manufacturers could also help ameliorate the lack of multidisciplinary treatments in certain areas. Currently, a multi-district
litigation (MDL) against opioid drug manufacturers is brewing in the
Northern District of Ohio. 216 Judge Polster, who is overseeing the
MDL, has expressed his desire to take concrete action to stop the
opioid crisis rather than merely engage in traditional litigation. 217 To
that end, one such solution could be a cy pres remedy in which drug
manufacturers agree, as part of a settlement, to spend money funding
and setting up multi-disciplinary pain clinics. Typically, cy pres
remedies are reserved for when “a settlement cannot feasibly
compensate class members directly,” and instead these efforts would
provide funding to organizations or interests that share similar goals
with the class. 218 Through patient records, it is possible that the
affected plaintiffs could be identified and compensated by a global
settlement. 219 However, if funds are left over, a cy pres settlement
funding multi-disciplinary pain clinics would serve the same interests
as plaintiffs (i.e., deterring future opioid abuse by transferring money
from drug manufacturers and generating alternative treatment
options to pain), thereby satisfying the court’s goals. In fact, Purdue
did something similar to this by helping fund an opioid addiction and
pain treatment center at Oklahoma State University as part of a
settlement agreement with the state of Oklahoma. 220
If it is not feasible to provide multi-disciplinary clinics in areas that
need them, other options exist to alleviate the opioid crisis. If opioids
must continue to be distributed to treat chronic pain, the CDC’s
guidelines for opioid treatment 221 should be followed. The guidelines
suggest, among other things: starting treatment with immediate-

216. In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio
2017), http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 [https://perma.cc/EY73-4T2D].
217. Transcript of Proceedings at 4–6, In re National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, Doc. No. 58.
218. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in
Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 882 (2016).
219. See What Information Does an Electronic Health Record (EHR) Contain?,
supra note 158.
220. German Lopez, OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Is Being Held
Accountable for the Opioid Epidemic, VOX (Mar. 26, 2019, 11:40 AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/3/26/18282262/opioid-epidemicpurdue-pharma-oxycontin-oklahoma-lawsuit-settlement
[https://perma.cc/HQ9BABV5].
221. DEBORAH DOWELL ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
CDC GUIDELINE FOR PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS FOR CHRONIC PAIN – UNITED STATES,
2016
(2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm
[https://perma.cc/KJ3H-3BYH] [hereinafter CDC GUIDELINE].
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release opioids, 222 prescribing opioids for acute pain for a short
duration, 223 continual evaluation by physicians regarding the costs
and benefits of the treatment, 224 reviewing a patient’s drug
prescription history for concomitant medications and assessing if
these medications, in combination with opioids, put the patient at a
high risk for overdose, 225 and using urine tests, both to ensure that the
patient is not using any other illicit drugs 226 and to test for the lack of
drugs to verify that the patient is actually taking the medication and
The guidelines also recommend alternative
not selling it. 227
treatments, even ones that are readily available, such as exercise. 228
B.

The Problem of Cancer Patients and Other Similarly Situated
Patients

The second consequence of exposing drug manufacturers to
increased liability, thereby restricting the flow of opioids, is that such
a policy will restrict access to opioids by those most reliant on these
agents: cancer patients and those in palliative or end-of-life care.229
Opioids are an important component of treatment for these
patients, 230 and there is no easy solution to ensuring these patients

222. Id. at 21.
223. Id. at 24 (recommending prescribing no more than three to seven days-worth
of opioids).
224. Id. at 25.
225. Id. at 29. The current monitoring system — known as the prescription drug
monitoring program (PDMP) — needs improvement, however. Although every state
but Missouri has such a system, patients can opt out of the system for privacy reasons,
and insurers (who supply the data) can refuse to opt in. Jan Hoffman, Patients in
Pain, and a Doctor Who Must Limit Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/health/er-pain-pills-opioids-addictiondoctors.html [https://perma.cc/3M6X-G9T9]. Further, most states’ systems are not
compatible with one another, meaning a patient can move from one state to another
and appear to have a clean slate. Id. A solution to these problems might include
mandatory reporting for opioid use, but also a national reporting system, or at least
standardization of state systems so that they work with one another. The latter policy
— a national reporting system or standardized state reporting systems — is supported
by the American College of Physicians. See generally Neil Kirschner et al.,

Prescription Drug Abuse: Executive Summary of a Policy Position Paper from the
American College of Physicians, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 198, 199 (Feb. 4,

2014), https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/1788221/prescription-drug-abuse-executivesummary-policy-position-paper-from-american [https://perma.cc/QDK7-PBST].
226. CDC GUIDELINE, supra note 221, at 30.
227. Hoffman, supra note 225.
228. CDC GUIDELINE, supra note 221, at 17.
229. Cf. id. at 1 (noting the guidelines do not apply to such patients).
230. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 80 (noting the importance of “pain relief and a
dignified death” and the irrelevance of addiction “[i]f people were soon to die” as
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would still have the same degree of access to opioids. Stringent
regulations could be imposed to limit the distribution of opioids to
only these types of patients. Drug manufacturers and insurance
companies could also work together to reduce the costs of these
medications for these patients. Or, perhaps most effectively, more
research could be conducted to ascertain which opioids are most
effective for cancer patients. 231 Surprisingly, there are few, if any,
nationwide studies on opioid prescriptions for cancer patients, 232 and
not all oncologists have adequate knowledge of pain management.233
Further, not every opioid is suitable for treating cancer patients,234
and there are conflicting results as to which opioids work for cancer
patients. For instance, weaker opioids are a major part of treatment
for cancer patients in Taiwan, but the European Society of Medical
Oncology and European Association of Palliative Care have put out
guidelines emphasizing the use of strong opioids in treating cancer
patients. 235 Accordingly, further research should be conducted
concerning the types of opioids that benefit cancer patients and other
similarly situated patients.
This strategy might allow drug
manufacturers to focus their efforts on creating drugs that benefit this
class of patients and allowing these select opioids to pass regulatory
hurdles, making them easier to access.
CONCLUSION
For decades, the learned intermediary doctrine has served as a
formidable protection against tort liability for drug manufacturers,
absolving them of the harms caused by their products so long as they
adequately warned prescribing physicians.
However, drug
manufactures have abused this exception and defeated its meaning by
interfering with the doctor-patient relationship through excessive

underlying the movement in the 1970s to treat cancer patients and terminally ill
patients with opioids); Chih-Peng Lin et al., Key Opioid Prescription Concerns in
Cancer Patients: A Nationwide Study, 54 ACTA ANAESTHESIOLOGICA TAIWANICA
51, 51 (2016) (noting opioids are crucial to pain management in cancer patients).
231. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 206, at 34 (“At the root of the
problem [of pain treatment] is the inadequate knowledge about the best approaches
to treat various types of pain, balancing the effectiveness with the potential for harm,
as well as a dysfunctional health care delivery system that encourages clinicians to
prescribe the easiest rather than the best approach for addressing pain.”).
232. See Lin et al., supra note 230, at 54 (noting this study was the first to
“specifically focus on the nationwide opioid prescription to patients with cancer”).
233. Id. at 52.
234. Id. at 51.
235. Id. at 55.
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marketing and misleading statements. In response, the principles
underlying the learned intermediary doctrine have been questioned
by legal scholars. The benefits of some drugs do not necessarily
outweigh their risks, and excessive marketing campaigns affect the
expectations of patients and encourage doctors to prescribe drugs
against their best judgment. The opioid crisis represents a confluence
of these actions, and it undermines the very pillars upon which the
learned intermediary doctrine rests. To remedy this crisis, an opioid
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine must be crafted so
that opioid manufacturers may be held liable in tort for the harm
caused by their drugs.

